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REBOOTING CALIFORNIA—  
INITIATIVES, CONVENTIONS AND 
GOVERNMENT REFORM:               
SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION 
Karl Manheim,* John S. Caragozian,** and  
Donald Warner*** 
All political power is inherent in the people. 
Government is instituted for the protection, security and benefit 
of the people; and they have the right to alter or reform the same, 
whenever the public good may require it. 
 




California is in trouble. Everyone knows it, but no one, it seems, 
is able to do anything about it. State government is failing its citizens 
in education, health care, infrastructure, parks, and elsewhere. Our 
chronic budget deficits are causing havoc in the delivery of public 
services and are depressing economic growth.2 City, county, and 
 
 * Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. 
 ** Adjunct Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. 
 *** Adjunct Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. The authors are grateful to 
Natalie Pifer for her invaluable research and editorial help. 
 1. The Constitution of 1879 repeated the same text, absent the last comma, and it has 
remained essentially the same since. This founding principle is now stated in the California 
Constitution, Article II, section 1: ―All political power is inherent in the people. Government is 
instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it 
when the public good may require.‖ 
 † This Introduction and the articles in this Symposium issue were written for the campus 
symposium held on September 24, 2010. That was five weeks prior to the general election, at 
which some of the constitutional changes discussed in the articles were voted on. Where relevant, 
we have noted the results of the November 2, 2010, election. 
 2. The Legislative Analyst‘s Office forecasts a General Fund deficit in excess of $20 billion 
for 2010–2011 and similar amounts for the foreseeable future. ―[T]he scale of the deficits is so 
vast that we know of no way that the Legislature, the Governor, and voters can avoid making 
additional, very difficult choices about state priorities.‖ The 2010–11 Budget: California’s Fiscal 
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school district budgets are repeatedly being raided, resulting in 
trickle-down misery.3 We know the Golden State4 has lost its luster 
when our license plates no longer carry that accolade but instead 
carry logos to ―help our kids‖ and fund our firefighters, parks, 
environment, arts, universities, and a variety of other public services 
that once were among the nation‘s best.5 At least it is better than a 
bake sale. 
Not all of the state‘s woes are of its own making. Some are due 
to the ongoing economic distress plaguing the nation and much of 
the developed world. California‘s problems go far deeper and reach 
further back than the current recession. The more enduring problems 
are structural and affect the way we govern ourselves. Thus, while 
the people of California have retained the right to reform their 
government ―whenever the public good may require it,‖ we have 
often had a hard time exercising that right in a constructive way. 
Proposed solutions to California‘s troubles are not in short 
supply, but ones that might actually work have been elusive. It seems 
that nearly every interest group—as well as many civic and 
governmental leaders—has a ―fix‖ in mind. Many of these solutions 
wind up on the ballot, which results in a bewildering array of 
complex legislative and constitutional amendments being put before 
the voters on a regular basis. But, as it turns out, 38 million 
Californians,6 composing one of the most diverse populations in the 
world,7 struggle to competently exercise our inherent political power. 
The consequence is a ―string of improvisations and hasty reforms 
 
Outlook, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST‘S OFFICE, Nov. 18, 2009, http://www.lao.ca.gov/2009/ 
bud/fiscal_outlook/fiscal_outlook_111809.aspx. 
 3. The 2010–11 Budget: California’s Fiscal Outlook, supra note 2 (―[W]e estimate [school 
funding] will decline in 2010–11 and again in 2011–12. Thus, if the state funds schools at the 
levels reflected in our forecast, school districts could face significant difficulties due to the 
simultaneous decreases in federal and state/local funding.‖). 
 4. ―The Golden State‖ was made the official state nickname in 1968. History and Culture—
State Symbols, CAL. STATE LIBRARY, http://www.library.ca.gov/history/symbols.html (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2010). 
 5. See California Special Interest License Plates, CAL. DEP‘T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, 
http://www.dmv.ca.gov/online/elp/elp.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). 
 6. California 2010 Census, CAL. COMPLETE COUNT, http://www.californiacompletecount. 
org/2010_census_explained/california_2010_census (last visited Oct. 11, 2010). 
 7. California, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California (last visited Oct. 11, 
2010). 
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that ha[ve] given California a governing system both unintended and 
unworkable.‖8 
The problems confronting California today are not nearly as dire 
as those that faced the nation at its inception. Still, as former state 
historian Kevin Starr has warned, we may be on the verge of 
becoming the ―first failed state in America.‖9 Accordingly, the 
challenge posed to the people of New York by Alexander Hamilton 
in Federalist Paper Number One is apropos: 
[I]t seems to have been reserved to the people of this 
country, . . . to decide the important question, whether 
societies of men are really capable or not of establishing 
good government from reflection and choice, or whether 
they are forever destined to depend for their political 
constitutions on accident and force. . . . [T]he crisis at 
which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the 
era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong 
election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve 
to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.10 
In the same spirit, but with less urgency, California‘s own 
government structure needs repair. To that end, this Symposium 
issue of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review brings together 
notable scholars, political leaders, and policy advocates to address 
the overriding problems facing California today. As we shall see in 
the pages that follow, none of these groups have reached a consensus 
on these issues, either among the polity or the leaders and scholars of 
the state. But the purpose of this Symposium is more modest. This 
Symposium aims to contribute to the dialogue and perhaps inform it 
in positive ways. This will, we hope, provide material for thought 
and for action, a springboard both for further academic endeavor and 
for practical political and administrative steps toward reform. One 
 
 8. JOE MATHEWS & MARK PAUL, CALIFORNIA CRACKUP: HOW REFORM BROKE THE 
GOLDEN STATE AND HOW WE CAN FIX IT 2–3 (2010). 
 9. Thad Kousser, Essay: The Blessings and Curses of Piecemeal Reform, 44 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 569, 571 (2011) (quoting Kevin Starr in Paul Harris, Will California Become America’s 
First Failed State?, OBSERVER (London), Oct. 4, 2009, at 32, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2009/oct/04/california-failing-state-debt). 
 10. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (A.B.A. ed., 2009). 
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thing is certain: California‘s luster is fading. We need a new 
approach. 
The following articles, essays, and commentaries were presented 
at a live Symposium at Loyola Law School Los Angeles on 
September 24, 2010, a few weeks before the general election.11 
Earlier in the year, it appeared that the November ballot would 
include a proposal to call a constitutional convention.12 The proposal 
ultimately did not make the ballot, but its proponents managed to 
launch several serious, albeit less ambitious in scope, efforts to bring 
about structural change. This Symposium issue covers those efforts, 
which consisted mostly of budgetary and political reforms. 
The Symposium consisted of four panels, listed here along with 
the panelists. Contributors to this issue are indicated by asterisks and 
their pieces are briefly described later in this Introduction. 
 Fiscal and Budgetary Problems/Reforms: Jon Coupal,13 
John Heilman,14 Robert Hertzberg,15 and Sheila Kuehl.16 
Dan Walters17 moderated this panel. 
 Electoral and Structural Reforms: Jessica Levinson,*18 
Justin Levitt,*19 Bruce McPherson,20 and Allan Ides.*21 
Sherry Bebitch Jeffe22 moderated this panel. 
 
 11. Not all of the oral presentations were accompanied by written submissions for the Law 
Review, but the Symposium website provides further information about all of the presenters. 
Loyola Law Sch. L.A., Rebooting California: Initiatives, Conventions & Government Reform, 
REBOOTCA.ORG, http://rebootca.org (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). 
 12. See infra notes 72–76 and accompanying text, and infra Part III.A.3.a; see also Steven 
Miller, Getting to a Citizens’ Constitutional Convention: Legal Questions (Without Answers) 
Concerning the People’s Ability to Reform California’s Government Through a Constitutional 
Convention, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545, 547–48 (2011). 
 13. President, Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, whose talk was titled Tax and Budget 
Limitations. 
 14. Mayor, West Hollywood, California, and Professor of Law, Whittier Law School, whose 
talk was titled Budgetary Impacts on California’s Cities. 
 15. Former Speaker, California State Assembly and Co-Chair, California Forward, whose 
talk was titled Bipartisan Fiscal Reforms. 
 16. Former Member, California State Senate, whose talk was titled Tax and Budget Issues. 
 17. Senior Political Writer and Columnist, The Sacramento Bee. 
 18. Director of Political Reform, Center for Governmental Studies, whose talk was titled The 
Constitutionality of Open Primaries. 
 19. Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles, whose talk was titled The 
Potential of Citizen Redistricting. 
 20. Former California Secretary of State and Leadership Council, California Forward, whose 
talk was titled Get Real, and Reform. 
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 Mechanisms for Constitutional Reform: Hon. Joseph 
Grodin,*23 Thad Kousser,*24 Ann Lousin,*25 Steven 
Miller,*26 and Raphael Sonenshein.*27 Karen Grigsby 
Bates28 moderated this panel. 
 The Future of Direct Democracy—Reforming the 
Initiative Process: Bruce Cain,29 Christopher Elmendorf,30 
Robert Stern,*31 and Gerald Uelmen.*32 Warren Olney33 
moderated this panel. 
In addition to our panelists and moderators, the Symposium 
featured as keynote speakers former Governor Gray Davis34 and 
Daniel Schnur.35 We owe a debt of gratitude to these keynote 
 
 21. Christopher N. May Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles, whose talk was 
titled Proportional Representation in the Legislature. 
 22. Senior Fellow, School of Policy, Planning and Development, University of Southern 
California and Political Analyst, KNBC. 
 23. Former Associate Justice, Supreme Court of California and Distinguished Emeritus 
Professor, University of California Hastings College of the Law, whose talk was titled Popular 
Sovereignty and Its Limits. 
 24. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, and 
Visiting Associate Professor, Bill Lane Center for the West, Stanford University, whose talk was 
titled The Blessings and Curses of Piecemeal Reform. 
 25. Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School, whose talk was titled How to Conduct a 
Constitutional Convention. 
 26. Hanson Bridgett LLP, Attorney for Repair California, whose talk was titled Getting to a 
Constitutional Convention. 
 27. Executive Director, Los Angeles Charter Reform Commission and Professor, California 
State University, Fullerton, whose talk was titled Constitutional Revision Commissions. 
 28. Los Angeles Correspondent for National Public Radio. 
 29. Director, Institute of Governmental Studies; Professor of Political Science, University of 
California, Berkeley, whose talk was titled Fixing Ballot Box Budgeting. 
 30. Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, whose talk was titled Why Sensible 
Judicial Enforcement of the Amendment/Revision Distinction Requires a Constitutional Revision. 
 31. President, Center for Governmental Studies, whose talk was titled Improving the 
Initiative Process. 
 32. Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law, whose talk was titled 
Enforcing the Single-Subject Rule for Initiatives. 
 33. Host & Executive Producer, Which Way, LA? and To the Point, KCRW. 
 34. Gray Davis was California‘s 37th Governor (1999–2003). Prior to that, he was Chief of 
Staff to Governor Jerry Brown (1975–1981), California State Assemblyman (1983–1987), 
California State Controller (1987–1995), and the 44th Lieutenant Governor of California (1995–
1999). 
 35. Chair, California Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) and Professor and 
Director, Jesse M. Unruh Institute of Politics, University of Southern California. Prior to being 
appointed to the FPPC, Schnur played an important role on the planning committee for the 
Symposium. 
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speakers, all of the panelists and moderators, and the many co-
sponsors of the Symposium: the California State Association of 
Counties, the California Supreme Court Historical Society, the 
Center for California Studies at Sacramento State University, the 
Center for Governmental Studies, the Civil Justice Program at 
Loyola Law School Los Angeles, the Jesse M. Unruh Institute of 
Politics at the University of Southern California, the League of 
California Cities, and the United Way of California. Final thanks go 
to Victor Gold, Dean of Loyola Law School Los Angeles, for his 
indispensible support of this Symposium. 
II.  HOW WE GOT HERE 
Californians ―have the right to alter or reform the [state 
constitution], whenever the public good may require it.‖36 While as 
Californians we have managed to alter our constitution over 500 
times since adopting it in 1879,37 true reform has been elusive. The 
distinction, and perhaps the problem, is reinforced by the constitution 
itself, which permits ―amendment‖ by voter initiative but does not 
permit voter-sponsored ―revision.‖38 While the distinction between 
the meanings of ―amendment‖ and ―revision‖ is imprecise, the 
California Supreme Court has stated that a revision is ―a fundamental 
change in the basic governmental plan or framework established by 
the Constitution.‖39 An amendment is a lesser change.40 
 
 36. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 2. 
 37. See Scott Dodson, The Peculiar Federal Marriage Amendment, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 783, 
803 n.127 (2004). Dodson suggests that as aggressive as California is in altering its constitution, 
it neither holds the record nor is unique in this respect. Id. For example, Alabama has amended its 
constitution over 700 times, and Texas has amended its over 400 times. Id. 
 38. Compare CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a) (―The initiative is the power of the electors to 
propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them.‖), with CAL. 
CONST. art. XVIII, § 1 (―The Legislature by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the 
membership of each house concurring, may propose an amendment or revision of the 
Constitution . . . .‖). 
 39. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 99 (Cal. 2009). 
 40. The California Supreme Court summarized its past holdings on the revision/amendment 
distinction in Strauss, 207 P.3d at 88–98. While we do not intend this Introduction to analyze the 
century-plus of case law on the difference between a revision and an amendment, it is fair to say 
that the court held that a proposed change in the constitution could affect ―our basic plan of 
government‖ through either the quantity or the quality of the changes. If, by either measure, the 
proposed change sufficiently affected the ―basic plan,‖ then the proposal would be a revision and 
the initiative would thus be unlawful. The holding in Legislature of California v. Eu, 816 P.2d 
1309 (Cal. 1991), that ―it must necessarily or inevitably appear from the face of the challenged 
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These labels—―revision‖ and ―amendment‖—have an enormous 
potential substantive difference. The constitution may be ―amended‖ 
by (i) ―two-thirds of the membership of each house concurring‖41 or 
by (ii) petition signatures of voters ―equal in number to . . . 
8 percent . . . of the votes for all candidates for Governor at the last 
gubernatorial election,‖ followed by voter approval.42 However, the 
constitution may only be ―revised‖ by two-thirds of the membership 
of each house, followed by voter approval43 or by a constitutional 
convention called in a like manner.44 In short, while the voters retain 
the power to initiate amendments, one-third-plus-one of the members 
of either house of the legislature can prevent any fundamental change 
to the constitution. 
In California, as elsewhere,45 super-majorities are exceedingly 
difficult to achieve. Thus, we remain stuck in a state of seemingly 
permanent impasse. To the extent that California‘s problems—
 
provision that the measure will substantially alter the basic governmental framework of our 
Constitution‖ is also significant. Id. at 1319. 
  Unfortunately, these seemingly simple rules have been difficult to apply. For example, in 
Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990), the California Supreme Court struck down 
Proposition 115 as being an impermissible revision because it restricted state courts from granting 
criminal defendants rights in excess of those guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 1096. The 
Court reasoned that Proposition 115‘s propensity to force state courts to follow federal courts‘ 
criminal-procedure precedents constituted a severe limitation on ―the independent force and effect 
of the California Constitution‖—hence, a revision. Id. at 1088. On the other hand, the California 
Supreme Court in Legislature of California v. Eu upheld Proposition 140—which imposed the 
nation‘s strictest term limits (and, according to many scholars and other experts, fundamentally 
changed the California Legislature)—as a permissible amendment because Proposition 140 fell 
short of substantially changing the ―fundamental structure of the Legislature.‖ 816 P.2d at 1318. 
Under Eu, the possible long-term consequences of Proposition 140 and its future effects on 
California government were not relevant to the distinction between amendment and revision. See 
id. 
  In light of even this highly abbreviated history, we conclude that it is difficult to predict 
how the California Supreme Court would categorize various proposed reform initiatives (i.e., as 
permissible amendments or as impermissible revisions). 
 41. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1. 
 42. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b); accord CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (―The electors may 
amend the Constitution by initiative.‖). 
 43. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1. 
 44. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2. 
 45. For example, the Illinois Constitution requires that amendments initiated in the general 
assembly be approved by three-fifths of each house and then approved again by the people. ILL. 
CONST. art. XIV, § 2. Similarly, the Texas State Constitution requires that proposed amendments 
be approved first by two-thirds of all members of both legislative houses and then subjected to a 
vote by the people. TEX. CONST. art. XVII, § 2. 
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persistently late and gimmick-laden budgets, underfunded 
elementary and secondary schools, colleges, universities, and the 
like—arise from the structure of state government, then the super-
majority required for any constitutional revision is a severe barrier. 
Much of the criticism deservedly falls on government leaders for 
their failure to address California‘s chronic problems. Nevertheless, 
as the ultimate sovereigns in the state‘s political system, the people 
themselves must bear principal blame. For example, a century ago, 
they gave themselves the power of direct democracy—the rights of 
initiative, referendum, and recall.46 Yet, in the intervening years they 
have often exercised that political power in ways that have made 
matters worse. Initiatives have hobbled the government‘s ability to 
raise and spend money, to pass laws, to elect our representatives, 
and, worst of all, to fix the very problems the people created. Ballot 
measures that have gone awry, leading to unintended consequences, 
are often hard to remedy. This is especially true of initiatives that 
amend the state constitution, and there have been hundreds of them.47 
What started out in 1879 as ―the third longest constitution in the 
world‖48 grew nearly five-fold to over 95,000 words before it was 
scaled back in 1974.49 Its length defies the admonition of Chief 
Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland,50 as it ―partake[s] 
of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by 
the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the 
 
 46. ―The initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the 
Constitution and to adopt or reject them.‖ CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a). ―The referendum is the 
power of the electors to approve or reject statutes or parts of statutes‖ with certain exceptions. 
CAL. CONST. ART. II, § 9(a). ―Recall is the power of the electors to remove an elective officer.‖ 
CAL. CONST. ART. II, § 13. 
 47. Symposium contributor Bruce Cain states that ―[f]rom 1879 to the mid-nineties, 
California ranks first in the nation in proposed amendments (812) and second in adopted ones 
(485), averaging 4.25 per year.‖ Bruce E. Cain, Constitutional Revision in California: The 
Triumph of Amendment over Revision, Address at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 
Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and Government Reform (Sept. 24, 
2010), available at www.rebootca.org/media.html. 
 48. BRIAN JANISKEE & KEN MASUGI, DEMOCRACY IN CALIFORNIA: POLITICS AND 
GOVERNMENT IN THE GOLDEN STATE 7 (2003). 
 49. PAT OOLEY, STATE GOVERNANCE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS DEALING WITH STATE GOVERNANCE, CONSTITUTION REVISION 
HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVE 3, 6 (1996), available at www.californiacityfinance.com/ 
CCRChistory.pdf; California Constitution, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_ 
Constitution (last visited Oct. 11, 2010). 
 50. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).  
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public.‖51 Indeed, the California ―constitution‖ is not so much 
constitutive as it is legislative.52 Each passing fancy and political 
urgency, it seems, finds its way into our constitution.53 This is not a 
new phenomenon. In 1930, the California Constitutional Revision 
Commission reported that ―constant amendment‖ of the constitution 
had ―produced an instrument bad in form, inconsistent in particulars, 
loaded with unnecessary detail, encumbered with provisions of no 
permanent value, and replete with matter which might more properly 
be contained in the statute law of the state.‖54 
The souring promise of direct democracy did not abate as our 
experience with these political tools continued into the twenty-first 
century. In a 2009 speech, California Chief Justice Ronald George 
stated: ―Frequent amendments—coupled with the implicit threat of 
more in the future—have rendered our state government 
dysfunctional.‖55 Notable examples support the chief justice‘s 
concerns and illustrate unanticipated problems with direct 
democracy. Have the property-tax limitations of Proposition 1356 
weakened local government and school districts, putting them at the 
mercy of the state legislature? Have the term limits of Proposition 
14057 deprived the legislature of expertise and encouraged short-
 
 51. Id. at 407. 
 52. See Karl Manheim & Edward Howard, A Structural Theory of the Initiative Power in 
California, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1165, 1165–74 (1998). 
 53. Many (perhaps most) initiatives seem ill suited for constitutional amendment. Without 
intending to disparage these in particular, some recent examples of voter-approved constitutional 
initiatives include Proposition 9, Victim‘s Bill of Rights Act of 2008: Marsy‘s Law, available at 
http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/initiatives/pdfs/i771_07-0100_a1ns.pdf (requiring victims‘ 
restitution), and Proposition 86, The Tobacco Tax Act of 2006, available at 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/vig_06/general_06/pdf/proposition_86/entire_prop86.pdf 
(increasing cigarette tax). Even statutory initiatives may have quasi-constitutional status. The 
legislature ―may amend or repeal an initiative statute‖ only when ―the initiative statute permits 
amendment or repeal without [voters‘] approval.‖ CAL. CONST, art. II, § 10(c). Thus, while 
approximately two-thirds of proposed initiative statutes since 1970 have permitted amendment by 
the legislature if consistent with the initiative‘s purpose, the proponents of a statutory initiative 
have the option of insulating it entirely from the legislature. Robert M. Stern, The Future of 
Direct Democracy, Address at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting 
California—Initiatives, Conventions, and Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at 
www.rebootca.org/media.html; see Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 11 Cal. 4th 1243 (1995). 
 54. OOLEY, supra note 49, at 6. 
 55. Joe Mathews, The California Fix: Making Amends, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2009, at A17. 
 56. This initiative has been embodied in the California Constitution, Article XIII(a). 
 57. The passage of Proposition 140 affected California‘s constitution in several sections. The 
most notable are: CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 2(a) (limiting state Senators to two terms and state 
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sighted behavior? Have the school-funding guarantees of Proposition 
9858 tied the legislature‘s hands in dealing with budget shortfalls? 
Our dysfunction is by now common knowledge and the focus of 
worldwide attention.59 What is less understood, indeed seemingly 
beyond reach—or, at least, beyond consensus—is how to fix 
California. Many have offered solutions, some of which have real 
promise. But it is not known whether these proposals would be 
accepted by an impatient electorate or would actually work if 
implemented. 
One of the problems is the very tool that was devised to get 
government out of the hands of powerful special interests and return 
control to the people. Direct democracy, most notably including the 
initiative process, was the fruit of the political reform movement of 
the early twentieth century,60 an outgrowth of a populism and 
discontent of that time that is not all that different from that seen 
today in California and around the country. It is perhaps the ultimate 
irony that initiatives are now more likely to be used by moneyed 
special interests than by grassroots reformers.61 Indeed, grassroots 
 
Assembly members to three terms); id. at art. V, § 2 (limiting any governor to two terms); id. at 
art. V, § 11 (limiting the lieutenant governor, attorney general, controller, secretary of state, and 
treasurer to two terms). 
 58. Proposition 98 impacted several sections of California‘s constitution. It added both 
section 5.5 and section 8.5 to Article XIII(b); in addition, it amended Article XIII(b), sections 2 
and 8. California Mandatory Education Spending, Proposition 98 (1988), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/California_Proposition_98_%281988%29 (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2010). 
 59. E.g., Cal. Thomas Tribune Media Servs., Time to Take on California’s Bloated Budget, 
SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Oct. 15, 2003, at 25A, available at http://articles.sun-
sentinel.com/2003/oct/15; Barrie McKenna, California on ‘Verge of System Failure,’ GLOBE AND 
MAIL (last updated Dec. 21, 2010, 1:18 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/economy/california-on-verge-of-system-failure/article1609891/; Jeff Segal & Dwight 
Cass, Treat California Just Like G.M., N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2009, at B2; Dan Walters, Outlook 
for Effective Change in California Is Poor, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 3, 2009, available at 
http://www.scrippsnews.com/content/walters-outlook-effective-change-california-poor; . 
 60. In California, Hiram Johnson spearheaded the movement. Johnson was elected as 
governor in 1910 and helped Theodore Roosevelt found the Progressive Party in 1912. History of 
Initiative and Referendum in California, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/ 
History_of_Initiative_and_Referendum_in_California (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 61. Perhaps no better example of this evolution can be described than that which underlaid 
the fate of the two proposed constitutional-convention initiatives described by attorney Steven 
Miller in his talk before the Symposium. Steven Miller, Getting to a Constitutional Convention, 
Address at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—
Initiatives, Conventions, and Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at 
www.rebootca.org/media.html. 
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groups typically find initiatives to be beyond their reach: most 
initiatives require a minimum of $2 million to $3 million to pay 
professionals to gather the signatures that qualify an initiative for the 
ballot, not to mention the additional sums needed to campaign for 
voter approval.62 This upending of direct democracy is likely to 
accelerate now that the U.S. Supreme Court has given the green light 
to corporations and other moneyed interests to spend at will on 
elections.63 
As the proliferation of special-interest initiatives continues, 
often putting inconsistent demands on state-government structures, 
people wonder why government has broken down. State and local 
governments have fewer resources and fewer tools at their disposal 
to solve the problems of an increasingly complex and diverse 
society. But still we blame our leaders for the ensuing lack of 
leadership. As of mid-2010, the California Legislature‘s approval 
rating stood at a historic low—around 16 percent.64 At 22 percent, 
 
 62. In 2010, a statutory initiative required 433,971 signatures to qualify for the ballot, and a 
constitutional initiative required 694,354 signatures to qualify. How to Qualify an Initiative: 
Statewide Ballot Initiative Guide, CAL. SEC‘Y OF STATE, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-
measures/how-to-qualify-an-initiative.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). California Signature 
Requirements, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/California_signature_ 
requirements (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). Usually, potential compensation for invalid signatures 
requires 20 or 30 percent more signatures. See id. Professional signature gatherers typically 
charge four to five dollars per signature. Ben van der Meer, Tis the Season for Signature-
Gatherers, MODESTO BEE (Dec. 17, 2007), http://www.modbee.com/2007/12/17/154626/tis-the-
season-for-signature-gatherers.html (―The gatherers are paid for every legitimate signature they 
get. The amount can vary, Arno said, from as little as 50 cents to up to $9 or $10 if organizers are 
running into a deadline to qualify the initiative.‖); Paid Vs. Volunteer Petitioners, NAT‘L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16502 (last 
updated June 17, 2010) (―Today, the vast majority of petition campaigns use paid circulators, 
who are paid between $1 and $3 per signature.‖). 
 63. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 884 (2010) (extending the line of cases 
starting with First Nat‘l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978), which held that corporations 
could spend money to influence ballot measures). For a recent example of industry‘s use of the 
initiative process to bypass or overturn the legislature, see Adam Nagourney, California Braces 
for Showdown on Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, at A16, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/us/17pollute.html?pagewanted=print (―Charles and David 
Koch, the billionaires from Kansas who have played a prominent role in financing the Tea Party 
movement, donated $1 million to the campaign to suspend the Global Warming Solutions Act, 
which was passed four years ago, and signaled that they were prepared to invest more in the 
cause. With their contribution, proponents of the proposition have raised $8.2 million, with 
$7.9 million coming from energy companies, most of them out of state.‖). 
 64. MARK DICAMILLO & MERVIN FIELD, FIELD RESEARCH CORP., THE FIELD POLL 1 
(2010), available at http://www.field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/Rls2346.pdf; see also Jim 
Sanders, California Redistricting Commission Wants a Few Good Citizens, SACRAMENTO BEE, 
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the governor‘s was not much better.65 And only 13 percent thought 
the state was moving in the right direction.66 Californians are 
unhappy but are unsure how to proceed. 
Perhaps it will take a revamping of the entire state constitution, 
or much of it, to restore a semblance of order to our government 
structures. Traditionally, a constitutional convention is the body that 
accomplishes wholesale revision of a constitution. It is there that ―the 
people‖ come together in an act of ultimate sovereignty and assert 
their original political power. If a convention is successful, frailties 
and limitations imposed by existing structures are swept aside. We 
may write on a ―clean slate,‖ more than metaphorically. 
But we may have overly romantic notions of constitutional 
conventions. The federal convention of 1789 produced a document 
that has proven to be one of the most successful foundational 
instruments of recent time. That convention operated illegally and 
was shrouded in secrecy,67 but the intellectual giants and pragmatic 
leaders who attended and debated in Philadelphia begat a 
government that has endured and prospered through more than two 
centuries of tumult and change. 
California‘s own experience with constitutional conventions is 
also the stuff of legend. Our first constitutional convention, in 1849, 
occurred in the aftermath of the U.S. military‘s conquest of 
California,68 during the gold rush, and with an eye to prospective 
statehood‘s ramifications in Washington, D.C. It is not so much that 
California‘s then-existing government was inadequate. Rather there 
was no existing government,69 despite a series of six disinterested or 
overwhelmed U.S. military governors beginning with the military 
 
Dec. 16, 2009, at 1A, available at http://www.sacbee.com/2009/12/15/2395982/california-
redistricting-commission.html (finding a 13 percent approval rating for the California 
Legislature). 
 65. DICAMILLO & FIELD, supra note 64, at 1. 
 66. Id. 
 67. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 275–76 (2d ed. 2005). 
 68. Constitutional Convention History, CITY OF MONTEREY, http://www.monterey.org/ 
museum/conventhis.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2010). 
 69. California‘s legal status was inchoate more than three years after the military conquest 
and even after the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hildago. Early Monterey History, CITY OF 
MONTEREY, http://www.monterey.org/museum/history.html#2 (last visited Oct. 21, 2010). 
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conquest in 1846.70 The convention chose statehood, and, in 1850, 
Congress approved it.71 
The delegates to the 1849 constitutional convention in Monterey 
had the opportunity to invent the state‘s government.72 They used the 
U.S. Constitution and other existing state constitutions as models, but 
California was the ―Wild West‖ and it faced different conditions. So 
the delegates innovated.73 For instance, California became officially 
as well as de facto bilingual, with the new constitution published in 
both English and Spanish.74 Perhaps presaging later attempts to 
―legislate‖ via the constitution, the right of married women to own 
separate property—an unusual right then in the United States—was 
guaranteed.75 
This first constitution lasted a scant thirty years. By 1878, it was 
already apparent that Sacramento was unresponsive to emerging 
needs. A second convention was called, and this produced the 
constitution of 1879. This constitution incorporated important 
changes: for example, it instituted ―home rule‖ for cities and 
counties, increasing their power and autonomy. But our second 
constitution also enshrined in the state‘s fundamental law provisions 
that reflected and enforced the rampantly anti-Chinese political 
climate of the 1870s and ‘80s. For this and other reasons, the 1879 
constitution also lasted barely thirty years.76 
The years 1909 to 1911 saw not a third convention, but the 
emergence of constitutional reform at least as profound as the 1879 
product. The initiative, the referendum, and the recall, which were 
adopted in 1911, have permanently shaped our government in no 
small way.77 Since then, California has resorted to less-sweeping 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Eugene C. Lee, The Revision of California’s Constitution, 3 CPS BRIEF 2 
(Apr. 1991), available at http://www.repaircalifornia.org/Docs/california_history.pdf. 
 74. Constitutional Convention History, supra note 68. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See generally CAL. STATE ARCHIVES, CAL. SEC‘Y OF STATE, INVENTORY OF THE 
WORKING PAPERS OF THE 1878–1879 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1993), available at 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/archives/collections/1879/archive/1879-finding-aid.pdf (providing 
historical context and background to the 1878–1879 California Constitutional Convention). 
 77. California Proposition 7 (1911), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_ 
Proposition_7_(1911) (last visited Nov. 10, 2010). 
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changes to its governing document. The legislature has 
commissioned three separate Constitutional Revision Commissions.78 
The last disbanded in 1996.79 These commissions spurred some 
important reforms, but they were fairly modest in scope.80 We have 
not had a real constitutional convention for 130 years.81 As California 
has changed drastically since the nineteenth century, we may need to 
rethink the way we govern ourselves. 
In 2009, two reform groups—perhaps despairing of nothing but 
continued, inadequate reforms—began efforts to call a constitutional 
convention. Under the current constitution, the legislature is the only 
body that can place a call for a constitutional convention on the 
ballot, just as it is the only body that can approve constitutional 
revisions.82 Such a call requires a two-thirds vote in each legislative 
house.83 Yet the legislature is unlikely ever to muster the two-thirds 
majorities required.84 Indeed, the last time the people asked for a 
convention, the legislature refused.85 (This intransigency is not 
unique to California. Legislators elsewhere also see conventions as a 
threat to their power. And where they do accede to popular demands 
for a convention, they may seek the opportunity to control it.)86 
Accordingly, these two reform groups sought to bypass the 
legislature to call a convention. As the California Supreme Court 
 
 78. California Constitution, supra note 49. 
 79. California Constitutional Convention, BALLOTPEDIA, http://www.ballotpedia.org/wiki/ 
index.php/California_constitutional_convention (last visited Nov. 10, 2010). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2 (―The Legislature by rollcall vote entered in the journal, 
two-thirds of the membership of each house concurring, may submit at a general election the 
question whether to call a convention to revise the Constitution. If the majority vote yes on that 
question, within 6 months the Legislature shall provide for the convention. Delegates to a 
constitutional convention shall be voters elected from districts as nearly equal in population as 
may be practicable.‖). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Karl Manheim et al., The California Quagmire, L.A. TIMES (May 24, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/24/opinion/la-oew-manheim-20100524 (―However, the 
Legislature is unlikely to achieve such a supermajority on whether the Pacific Ocean is salty, so 
little chance exists that it would propose a convention or a new constitution.‖). 
 85. Editorial, The California Fix: Start from Scratch, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2009, at A29. 
 86. The New York Times opposes a proposed constitutional convention for New York State 
for this reason. See Editorial, The New York Convention Con, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2010, at A18. 
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observed in Legislature of California v. Eu,87 ―the initiative process 
may represent the only practical means of achieving the kind of 
‗reforms‘ of the Legislature involved [t]here, because the revision 
process can be initiated only with the consent of two-thirds 
membership of each house of the Legislature.‖88 
A group called California Action Network realized the dual 
nature of the constitutional challenge ahead of it—to amend the 
constitution to allow a call by initiative, and then to make the call—
and thus submitted two companion initiatives to the attorney general 
in June 2009.89 This began the process of qualifying the initiatives for 
the November 2010 ballot.90 The first initiative purported to ―amend‖ 
the constitution by allowing the voters to call a constitutional 
convention by initiative. (In other words, the legislature would no 
longer be the exclusive route to a convention.) If voters approved 
that first initiative, the second measure would actually call a 
convention. 
The initiatives were cleared for signature gathering, but the 
effort never got off the ground. Had it succeeded, the ensuing 
convention procedure would have been unconventional, indeed, 
quirky. The entire California Supreme Court would have been 
sequestered along with the delegates to ―provide legal advice and 
counsel to the Convention.‖91 Sequestration would be accomplished 
by the California Highway Patrol92 to ―isolate [the delegates] from all 
contact with any efforts by any special interest, political party, non-
elected third persons, and any other outside influence from any 
source, for the duration of the Constitutional Convention.‖93 
 
 87. 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991). 
 88. Id. at 1316. 
 89. See Paul Talcott Currier, Proposed Constitutional Amendment Article 36: Electors Right 
to Call for a Constitutional Convention, (June 23, 2009), http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/ 
initiatives/pdfs/i815_initiative_09-0018.pdf; Paul Talcott Currier, Proposed Constitutional 
Amendment Article 37: Electors Call a Constitutional Convention (June 23, 2009) (measure 09-
0019), http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/initiatives/pdfs/i816_initiative_09-0019.pdf [hereinafter 
Currier, Article 37].  
 90. Id. 
 91. Currier, Article 37, supra note 89, § 2(3). 
 92. Id. § 5(n). 
 93. Id. § 7(b). 
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A second and more serious effort to call a convention was 
undertaken in October 2009 by an initially well-funded group called 
Repair California. It too submitted two companion initiatives to the 
attorney general to begin the process of qualifying them for the 
November 2010 ballot. As with the California Action Network 
measures, Repair California‘s first initiative would ―amend‖ Article 
XVIII of the state constitution to permit the calling of a ―Citizens‘ 
Constitutional Convention‖ by initiative.94 The companion initiative 
would have actually called the convention had voters approved the 
first initiative. ―Amend‖ is in quotation marks because a lawsuit 
challenging the change to Article XVIII as an illegal ―revision‖ of 
the constitution was inevitable. The lawsuit never materialized 
because the Repair California effort stalled when the group 
announced that it lacked the money to gather enough signatures to 
qualify the proposed initiatives for the ballot. 
Thus, well-intentioned and highly touted efforts to reboot 
California by means of a constitutional convention never came about. 
The demise came despite strong backing from the governor95 and 
from the Los Angeles Times (―the Times‖), which devoted an entire 
editorial series to it. In ―California Fix,‖ the Times argued that 
California‘s constitution was so dysfunctional that it needed to ―start 
from scratch.‖96 
After years of ballot measures that undermined or eradicated one 
another, Californians must recognize that our third convention is 
already underway and has been in session for more than three 
decades. It was called in 1978, when voters launched the property-
tax revolt with Proposition 13. New resolutions come to the 
imaginary floor of this virtual convention. Some come from the left, 
creating programs and capturing funding, as with 2004‘s Proposition 
63, which raised income taxes to fund mental health programs. Some 
come from the right, limiting governmental power and discretion, as 
with 1990‘s Proposition 140, which limited the time that state elected 
 
 94. See Jim Wunderman, Initiative Constitutional Amendment: Citizen‘s Constitutional 
Convention Act (Oct. 28, 2009), http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/initiatives/pdfs/i863_ 
initiative_09-0066.pdf. 
 95. George Skelton, Schwarzenegger Is Getting His Second Wind as a Reformer, L.A. TIMES 
(Feb. 26, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/26/local/me-cap26. 
 96. See Editorial, supra note 85. 
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officials could serve in office. But instead of being considered 
together, these resolutions are adopted one by one, resulting in a 
patchwork document with a self-negating message: government must 
do more, and it must have less power and less money with which to 
do it.97 
Over the next several months, the Times continued with its 
editorial theme that California faced ―so many problems, so many 
competing interests [that] only rewriting the Constitution will do.‖98 
Yet, after the collapse of Repair California‘s efforts, revising the 
state constitution remains a distant vision. It may be that entrenched 
interests simply will not let it happen. And without visionaries like 
Hiram Johnson, our state could easily remain in limbo for the 
indefinite future. 
Of course, wholesale revision is not the only way to cure the 
most pressing problems with our constitutional structure or 
government institutions. We can continue with the piecemeal 
approach and perhaps—with luck, perseverance, and the economy‘s 
eventual recovery—achieve meaningful reforms. Although the call 
for a convention did not appear on the 2010 ballot, a number of less-
ambitious yet important measures did. Among these were measures 
prohibiting the state from seizing tax revenues dedicated to local 
government99 and eliminating the legislature‘s super-majority 
requirement to pass the state budget100 or to impose fees and taxes,101 
as well as competing initiatives to repeal or extend the non-partisan 
redistricting commission.102 Voters approved a June 2010 ballot 
measure replacing partisan primary elections with a ―top-two‖ 
system. As with all of the recent amendments to the constitution, the 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Editorial, The California Fix: Taming the Beast, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009, at A29. 
 99. Proposition 22, which passed by a vote of 5,733,755 (60.7 percent) to 3,725,014 
(39.3 percent). CAL. SEC‘Y OF STATE, 2010 GENERAL ELECTION: STATEMENT OF VOTE 7 (2011), 
available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2010-general/complete-sov.pdf. 
 100. Proposition 25, which passed by a vote of 5,262,051 (55.1 percent) to 4,292,648 (44.9 
percent). Id. 
 101. Proposition 26, which passed by a vote of 4,923,834 (52.5 percent) to 4,470,234 (47.5 
percent). Id. 
 102. Propositions 20 (extend) and 27 (repeal), of which Proposition 20 passed by a vote of 
5,743,069 (61.3 percent) to 3,636,892 (38.7 percent). Id. 
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jury is still out, necessarily, on what these measures might 
accomplish, especially in the long term. 
III.  THE SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES AND ESSAYS 
The notion of ―rebooting‖ is derived from the computer 
operation where a malfunctioning operating system is shut down and 
restarted, clearing out any corrupted memory cells and software 
glitches.103 Hopefully, rebooting California does not entail shutting 
the system down, although parts of it seem headed in that direction. 
Nonetheless, we may need to clear out malfunctioning components 
to get our ―central processing unit‖ (state government) functioning 
again at the level we need. 
Continuing with computer metaphors, our state seems to be 
―closed source‖: various structural ―locks‖ (e.g., legislative obstacles 
such as super-majority requirements for budgets and constitutional 
reform) impede our ability to adapt to challenges. This Symposium 
was an effort to move to an ―open source‖ model in two senses—
first, by examining those locks and advocating the removal of those 
that have become obsolete, and second, by seeking ideas from new 
sources. Thus, we invited some of the best political and legal minds 
to offer their solutions to particular problems in California 
governance. 
This part summarizes the diagnoses and prescriptions offered at 
the Symposium, many of which are more fully developed in the 
articles and essays that follow this Introduction. The major issues 
have been divided into four categories: (1) budgetary and fiscal; 
(2) electoral; (3) constitutional reform; and (4) direct democracy. 
Each of these might justify a symposium in its own right. But they 
are all related, and they all contribute to California‘s condition. 
Whether piecemeal or comprehensive reform is preferred is itself an 
issue discussed in the Symposium. All told, there are some excellent 
ideas in the pages that follow. We believe that some, at least, will 
 
 103. Starting a computer is often referred to as ―booting‖ because older Disk Operating 
Systems (DOS) used a ―boot‖ disk to initialize the operating system. The boot disk contained the 
initial instructions that the computer needed to talk to its various parts, including the central 
processing unit. Booting, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booting (last visited Nov. 10, 
2010). 
    
Winter 2011] INTRODUCTION 411 
 
take hold and that California‘s operating system will get a much-
needed upgrade. 
A.  The Symposium Panels 
Seventeen panelists and four moderators104 explored the critical 
issues facing California.105 Participants presented articles in the 
second, third, and fourth panels and offered provocative analyses in 
all of them. 
1.  Fiscal and Budgetary Problems and Reforms 
The day before the Symposium, Governor Schwarzenegger and 
legislative leaders announced a ―framework agreement‖ on the 
2010–2011 state budget. Details were not released until just before 
the budget was approved on October 8, more than 100 days beyond 
the constitutional deadline,106 making it the latest budget in California 
history.107 The budget pleased no one. The Times called it ―[a]n ugly, 
temporary answer to California‘s intractable budget problems.‖108 
Once again, California faced unsolvable budgetary constraints. 
Sacramento needed to close a $19 billion gap between revenue and 
expenditures. The governor refused to entertain any tax increases, so 
the legislature resorted to the only tools at its disposal—spending 
cuts and budgetary gimmicks.109 The cuts were brutal, including 
$3.5 billion in public education110 and $820 million in prison medical 
facilities (despite a federal court order that the state improve prisoner 
 
 104. See supra notes 13–33. 
 105. Video of the panels can be found on the Symposium website: http://rebootca.org. 
 106. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12 (―The Legislature shall pass the budget bill by midnight on 
June 15 of each year.‖). 
 107. Shane Goldmacher & Evan Halper, Lawmakers Sweat the Small Stuff; Budget OK 
Comes Only After Hours of Parochial or Partisan Wrangling, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2010, at A1. 
 108. Evan Halper, An Ugly, Temporary Answer to California’s Intractable Budget Problems, 
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2010), http://latimes.com/news/local/la-me-late-budgets20101010,0, 
2660478.story. 
 109. Sheila Kuehl referred to this as ―an all-cuts budget,‖ which the governor has proposed 
for five of the last six years. Sheila Kuehl, Tax and Budget Issues, Address at the Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and 
Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/media.html 
 110. Even since Proposition 13, school districts in California have relied on state revenues for 
the bulk of their revenues, and they cannot easily make up shortfalls due to the requirement (also 
in Proposition 13) that property-tax increases (the traditional source for school funding) be 
approved by a two-thirds vote. 
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medical care). Governor Schwarzenegger made an additional 
$1 billion in line-item cuts when he signed the budget bill.111 The 
gimmicks, which had been used before, included pushing some 
expenditures into the next fiscal year and using unrealistic revenue 
projections, such as projecting $2 billion more in federal revenue 
sharing than the legislature actually expected from Washington.112 
Creative accounting of this sort is one reason why California‘s 
budget problems are endemic. 
There is broad consensus that California‘s fiscal problems are 
not transitory.113 They are deep-seated and structural. An obvious 
example is Proposition 13‘s requirement that the legislature, by two-
thirds majorities in both houses,114 approve any tax increases. As Joe 
Matthews and Mark Paul note, this feature gave the minority party 
power to dictate tax policy without shouldering accountability to the 
voters for its actions: ―The legislative majority felt the burden of 
governing the state, but the minority could delay the most basic task 
of the legislature—passing a budget—without being held 
responsible.‖115 The minority often extracted concessions for favored 
constituencies—California‘s version of pork-barrel politics—even 
during times of budgetary crisis. With Proposition 13, ―[t]his form of 
hostage-taking became the norm.‖116 
For several years after Proposition 13 forever altered the state‘s 
revenue system, the government of the world‘s eighth-largest 
economy managed to limp along on accrued surpluses, the dot-com 
boom, and other non-recurring events. However, booms turned to 
 
 111. Jack Dolan & Shane Goldmacher, Veto Ax Cuts into Social Programs, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 9, 2010, at AA. 
 112. The Times reported the following: 
The most optimistic projections show that the spending plan Schwarzenegger signed 
Friday will produce a shortfall of at least $10 billion—more than 11% of state 
spending—in the next fiscal year. Many experts predict it will be billions more. The 
leaders mostly papered over this year‘s gap, punting many tough decisions forward.  
Halper, supra note 108. 
 113. See MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 8, at 7, 79–104; see also supra page 394. 
 114. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA. 
 115. MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 8, at 47–48. Previously, a two-thirds vote from each 
house of the legislature was needed to pass California‘s budget, but Proposition 25, which passed 
on November 2, 2010, changed the two-thirds requirement to a simple majority. Proposition 13‘s 
two-thirds requirement for tax increases was unaffected by Proposition 25. 
 116. Id. at 47. 
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busts and the economic house came crashing down. The panelists on 
the Symposium‘s first panel had different prescriptions for putting 
our fiscal house back in order. 
Jon Coupal—who carries the torch of the late Howard Jarvis, 
author of Proposition 13—rejected that tax-cutting measure as the 
source of the state‘s perpetual budget crisis.117 It is not the lack of 
revenues that plagues the state, he claimed, but the expansion of 
spending programs.118 It is the ―change in the perception of 
government; less as an instrument to provide services for all, than 
more as an instrument to pick winners and losers, or even worse to 
redistribute wealth.‖119 Coupal thinks California would be better off 
with a part-time legislature and more spending limits in order to rein 
in unnecessary spending, such as spending on bloated welfare rolls. 
Other panelists echoed Coupal‘s criticism of legislative 
spending, although they did not necessarily agree with his analysis of 
cause and effect. West Hollywood Mayor John Heilman presented 
the perspective of California‘s municipalities.120 Heilman said that 
one feature of Proposition 13 is that it removed revenue authority 
from local governments, and it was reposed in Sacramento. As a 
result of its fiscal dominance, the legislature often solves state-
government budget problems on the backs of California cities, 
counties, and school districts. Heilman complains that this ―raiding‖ 
of local-government revenues seriously undermines local 
government‘s ability to provide public services.121 Heilman spoke in 
favor of the November 2010 ballot‘s Proposition 22, which protects 
local revenue sources from the legislature.122 He also criticized the 
two-thirds-majority requirement for state budgets, claiming that it 
 
 117. Jon Coupal, Tax and Budget Limitations, Address at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and Government Reform 
(Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/media.html. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. John Heilman, Budgetary Impacts on California‘s Cities, Address at the Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and 
Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/media.html. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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generally lowers bond ratings and raises the cost of capital for 
municipal borrowing.123 
Sheila Kuehl, who served six years in the California Assembly 
and eight years in the state senate, reinforced Heilman‘s criticism of 
the budget process.124 She claimed that beyond the budget process, 
the ideological polarization of the state (and the country) has led to 
an impasse.125 Some, including then-Governor Schwarzenegger, want 
to cut education or services to the poor, while others seek to close tax 
loopholes for the wealthy and corporations. Kuehl gives property 
taxes under Proposition 13 as an example: homeowners are taxed on 
an average assessed valuation of $16 per square foot, while 
Disneyland is taxed on a valuation of 5 cents per square foot.126 
Kuehl and several other panelists painted Proposition 13 as a leading 
cause of the state‘s ills.127 Some of the panelists suggested a ―split-
roll,‖ where property-tax limits would remain on residential property 
but would be removed from commercial property.128 
Kuehl also bemoans the deteriorating state of California public 
schools. Discussing the Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School 
District, she said it is  
one of the best funded in the state, [but] we have no full-
time janitors. The students do work-study to try to keep it 
clean. We have no school libraries, really. . . . We have no 
school nurses. . . . We laid off 16,000 teachers last year 
because of the budget.129  
 
 123. Id. 
 124. Kuehl, supra note 109. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Cf. CAL. TAX REFORM ASS‘N, SYSTEM FAILURE: CALIFORNIA‘S LOOPHOLE-RIDDEN 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTY TAX 83 (2010), available at http://www.caltaxreform.org/pdf_ppt/ 
SystemFailureFinalReportMay2010.pdf (stating that recent Disneyland property acquisitions are 
taxed at a valuation of 37 cents per square foot). 
 127. Kuehl, supra note 109. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. In actuality, most sources report layoffs exceeding 26,000, not 16,000. See, e.g., 
News Release, Cal. Dep‘t of Educ., Schools Chief Jack O‘Connell Joins Educators in 
Recognition of Record Number of Teachers Receiving Layoff Notices (Mar. 14, 2009), available 
at http://www.cde.ca.gov/nr/ne/yr09/yr09rel40.asp. 
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Kuehl‘s prescription ―to cure the dysfunction‖ includes eliminating 
the two-thirds majority requirement for passing a budget ―and then 
hold[ing] the majority responsible for the budget.‖130 
Bob Hertzberg, former speaker of the assembly, agreed: 
California‘s budget mess is why ―we can‘t make California work in 
this globalized economy.‖131 At the recent World Economic Forum in 
China, which he attended, California was seen as an embarrassment. 
―The story that comes out is that we can‘t seem to get our 
government together.‖132 Hertzberg also spoke of one of Proposition 
13‘s ―unintended consequences,‖ which was to remove revenue 
accountability from local government officials and centralize it (and 
spending policy) in Sacramento.133 
Hertzberg‘s view is widely shared.134 Now distanced from the 
electoral scrutiny that accompanies responsibility for raising revenue, 
local governments have pursued often highly irregular spending 
priorities. For instance, according to Mathews and Paul, the median 
wage in 2008 of Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District truck drivers 
was $144,274, about three times the median wage in Sacramento 
County.135 No one was looking, it seems, when fiscal accountability 
was lifted off of local governments and sent to the state legislature. 
Nor did anyone understand this transfer of power and loss of 
accountability as one of the major reforms of Proposition 13. 
From there, the fiscal picture and the shenanigans get even 
worse. Lower bond ratings raise the cost of borrowing for 
meritorious projects and create an uncertain business climate, just 
when we can least afford it. Since the state cannot live off borrowed 
money—except when it does—the legislature consistently sanitizes 
truly scary budgets by resorting to gimmicks, such as delaying a 
payday by a day, throwing it into the next fiscal year, or presuming 
returns on investments that will never materialize. Or ―deeming‖ that 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Robert Hertzberg, Bipartisan Fiscal Reforms, Address at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and Government Reform 
(Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/media.html. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 8, at 55. 
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past revenues were at a level they actually were not at.136 ―Deeming‖ 
(rewriting) history is a technique that would have made Big Brother 
proud.137 
Perhaps we will soon start charging for public safety services, 
just as we do for use of parks, education, health care, and other social 
services. Or we can furlough university professors and pay them only 
for the days they actually teach138 and not for non-teaching days 
when they are idle (i.e., when they are preparing classes, doing 
research, meeting with students, grading papers, contributing to 
professional organizations, doing government and non-profit 
consulting, recruiting, collaborating, giving interviews, performing 
administrative tasks, etc.; all idle activities apparently). And 
remember when those pesky parking tickets were $5? Fines, fees, 
excises, charges, reimbursements, assessments, and other taxes 
(except that the state cannot now call them taxes) fill holes in local 
budgets that once were the province of property taxes. And watch out 
for those red-light cameras. At $500 per ticket, one might think one 
was single-handedly funding what is left of municipal government.139 
California government is under attack from the right because of 
the perception of high taxes; it is under attack from the left for failing 
to provide what are perceived to be essential social services 
 
 136. For instance, in 1993, Senate Bill 1135 allocated $2.6 billion of local property-tax 
revenues to newly created Educational Revenue Augmentation Funds within each county to 
partially offset the legislature‘s Proposition 98 funding requirements. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE 
§§ 97.02, 97.035 (West 2009). To further reduce the legislature‘s funding obligations, the 
California Education Code provided that ―fund revenues appropriated for school districts and 
community college districts, respectively, in fiscal year 1986–1987 . . . shall be deemed to be‖ a 
different amount than was actually appropriated by the legislature seven years earlier. CAL. 
EDUC. CODE § 41204.5 (West 2009) (emphasis added). 
 137. Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949) (rewriting history constantly to 
reflect current policies). 
 138. While many states, including California, have begun to furlough university professors, 
Arizona State University seems to have perfected the scheme with its 8–12 percent salary 
reduction. ―Faculty members will take furloughs on days they don‘t teach class, and supervisors 
of staff members will be staggering furloughs so that the university remains fully operational.‖ 
Michael Crow, Message from President Michael Crow, ASU NEWS (Jan. 28, 2009), 
http://asunews.asu.edu/20090128_furloughprogram (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
 139. See All Things Considered: $500 for Running a Red Light? Blame the Camera, National 
Public Radio (Apr. 14, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 
125990368. Traffic cameras are big-time money generators for municipalities, and it is no wonder 
that ―to help solve California‘s $20 billion dollar crisis, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger has 
suggested retrofitting 500 city and county traffic cameras to generate even more money.‖ Id. The 
fine for running a red light in Culver City can be $540. Id. 
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(education, health care, elder care, and so forth). Likewise, both Wall 
Street (which has downgraded both the state and local governments‘ 
bonds) and public-employee labor unions (which saw their members 
furloughed and once faced the threat of Governor Schwarzenegger‘s 
minimum-wage order) have declining confidence in the state‘s 
government. Also, the trickle-down effects on local governments 
have included broad employee furloughs, superior court staff layoffs, 
school librarian layoffs, early releases of jailed inmates, closing of 
public libraries, elimination of cultural and recreational programs, 
and so on and on and on. Is anyone pleased with the state‘s 
government or financial picture? 
2.  Electoral and Structural Reforms 
The foundational idea of democracy is that government exists 
with the consent of the governed. Yet in 2010, California‘s 
government was so broadly unpopular that one may have wondered 
about its legitimacy. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, who 
replaced former Governor Gray Davis after the latter‘s recall in 
2003, has ratings as low or lower than those of the governor he 
ousted.140 The legislature, in turn, is even less popular than the 
governor.141 That the state‘s government is so unpopular with so 
many major constituencies cannot be the mere result of enacting a 
controversial statute or two. Such statutes might well draw criticism 
from opponents, but they should draw support from proponents. In 
California it is difficult to find any supporters of the current 
government. 
Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to ask whether the 
very structure of California government is at least partly responsible. 
State fiscal problems may underlie many features of life in California 
that its citizens find unsatisfactory. Underlying those fiscal problems, 
however, are aspects of governmental structure (e.g., the relationship 
between the state and subordinate governmental entities and the role 
of initiatives and referenda in legislation) and political process (e.g., 
 
 140. David Siders, Arnold Schwarzenegger Approval Drops to Record Low—Tied with Gray 
Davis, SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 30, 2010, 10:19AM), http://www.sacbee.com/2010/07/14/ 
2888500/arnold-schwarzenegger-approval.html. 
 141. Id.  
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direct democracy again, term limits, voting methods, the role of 
money) that must be addressed if we hope to accomplish reform. 
Going beyond this general answer, that governmental structure 
is at least in part to blame, involves substantial debate, as various 
constituencies assess the likelihood that a particular restructuring 
may or may not be of future benefit. We should not shy away from 
such debates, as democracies are supposed to allow—indeed, 
encourage—them. That is the focus of some of the articles in this 
Symposium. 
First, and most important, what type of government do we want 
for the long term? By that, we do not mean to ask whether we want a 
dictatorship or a democracy, or even whether we should have a 
republican form of government as guaranteed by Article IV of the 
U.S. Constitution. Just as within that guarantee, there is a wide range 
of possible democratic structures. 
a.  Allan Ides—Proportional representation in the legislature142 
Professor Ides explores the possibility of replacing our 
bicameral legislature with a unicameral one based on mixed 
membership, in the following sense.143 Such a body would be 
selected in part using the single-member district, plurality-takes-all 
system we currently have.144 But an equal part of the legislature 
would be selected based on proportional representation, as practiced 
in most other industrial democracies.145 He posits that such a system 
would better reflect voter preferences and would release us from the 
duopolistic (two-party) political system that has, recently at least, 
failed to responsibly govern the state.146 
Ides argues that our bicameral legislature (and that of every 
other state but Nebraska) is a relic of the class-based division of 
power in the British Parliament, where one house represented the 
 
 142. Allan Ides, Proportional Representation in the Legislature, Address at the Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and 
Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/media.html; see Allan Ides, 
Approximating Democracy: A Proposal for Proportional Representation in the California 
Legislature, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437 (2011) [hereinafter Ides, Approximating Democracy]. 
 143. Ides, Approximating Democracy, supra note 142, at 441.  
 144. Id. at 455.  
 145. Id.; see id. at 440.  
 146. Id. at 441. 
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aristocracy and royalty, a feature long gone (one hopes) from this 
continent.147 It also emulates the structure of the U.S. Congress but 
lacks basis in federalism for having two houses differently 
composed.148 Given that the California Senate and Assembly are now 
both selected in the same manner and represent similar 
constituencies, a bicameral legislature serves only one purpose—to 
impede the enactment of majority-supported legislation.149 It is anti-
democratic in that it gives the party out of power two chances to 
defeat popular legislation.150 This is especially apparent with the 
super-majority requirements noted above for the adoption of budgets, 
tax policy, and any meaningful reform measures. A bicameral 
legislature may have been an innocuous feature of earlier, smaller 
governments, but it has become an obstacle to effective governing in 
modern times, especially given the extreme partisan battlefield that 
American politics has become.151 
Ides further argues that half of the legislature should be selected 
through an ―open party list‖ system, where each party appearing on 
the ballot is awarded seats in proportion to their respective shares of 
the regional vote as long as they surpass a qualifying threshold (Ides 
suggests 5 percent of the total vote).152 He argues that the advantages 
of proportional representation are several: to break the duopoly‘s 
hold, to promote minority and female representation, to better reflect 
California‘s political pluralism, and to create the truly representative 
democracy that we cherish.153 
 
 147. Id. at 455. 
 148. At one time, the senate and assembly emulated the U.S. Congress in that the two houses 
represented different political communities. Assembly districts were based on population, while 
senators represented counties. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), held that that structure 
violated the 14th Amendment‘s equal protection clause. Id. at 568. 
 149. Ides, Approximating Democracy, supra note 142, at 456.  
 150. See id.  
 151. See Harold Meyerson, A One-House Legislature, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2009, at A35 
(―In the name of fostering transparency, ending gridlock, curtailing backroom deals and creating a 
more responsive government, why doesn‘t California just abolish the Senate and create a larger 
Assembly?‖). 
 152. Ides, Approximating Democracy, supra note 142, at 459–60. 
 153. Id. at 444, 462. 
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b.  Jessica Levinson—The constitutionality of open primaries154 
Jessica Levinson questions the constitutionality of one of 
California‘s latest ventures into constitutional change: Proposition 
14.155 Passed in the June 2010 election, Proposition 14 creates open 
primary elections in which only the top two vote-getters—regardless 
of their party affiliations—proceed to the general election.156 
Levinson explains the problems created by an open primary for third-
party and independent candidates. However, before sounding the 
death knell for these candidates in California, Levinson examines 
whether Proposition 14 could survive scrutiny by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.157 
Here, she provides a comprehensive survey of the Court‘s 
decisions surrounding the ballot access of minor parties and 
independent candidates. While the case law is anything but clear, 
Levinson projects that Proposition 14 would ultimately not survive 
scrutiny under the Court‘s current test for determining the 
constitutionality of ballot access restrictions.158 However, Levinson 
does not rely on the Court to remedy the problems that Proposition 
14 has created. Rather, she proposes legislative solutions: changing 
the election code‘s qualification threshold and allowing write-in 
votes.159 
 
 154. Jessica A. Levinson, The Constitutionality of Open Primaries, Address at the Loyola of 
Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and 
Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/ media.html; see Jessica A. 
Levinson, Is the Party Over? Examining the Constitutionality of Proposition 14 as It Relates to 
Ballot Access for Minor Parties, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 463 (2011) [hereinafter Levinson, Is the 
Party Over?]. 
 155. Levinson, Is the Party Over?, supra note 154, at 467–68. 
 156. Id. at 467. 
 157. Id. at 507–13. 
 158. Id. at 511. 
 159. Id. at 513. 
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c.  Justin Levitt—The potential of citizen redistricting160 
In his Symposium remarks, Professor Levitt explores the 
experiment that is citizen redistricting. While Levitt is conscious of 
the advantages implicit in entrusting the redistricting process to 
incumbent legislators—such as political accountability, negotiation 
skills, and expertise—he is equally mindful of the challenges that 
such trust implicates.161 Here, Levitt uses examples to demonstrate 
that giving legislators the redistricting responsibility poses the danger 
that the public interest will be conflated with both personal and 
partisan interests, somewhat like giving the fox the keys to the 
henhouse.162 With this in mind, Levitt turns to the alternatives—from 
hypothetical computer programs to Iowa‘s non-partisan legislative 
staff agency model—focusing his exploration on California‘s 
experiment with citizen redistricting.163 Two measures on the 
November 2010 ballot implicated citizen redistricting. One measure 
aimed to repeal the existing but not yet active citizen-redistricting 
experiment, and the other sought to extend the citizen-redistricting 
panel‘s powers to include not only the state legislature but also 
Congress.164 
While Levitt admits that citizen redistricting is no ―magic 
bullet‖ for all of California‘s ills, he thinks that the redistricting 
process—if entrusted to a group of people without any natural 
conflicts of interest in the lines they are charged to draw—would be 
a powerful tool. As Levitt explains, California‘s model involves 
careful screening to ensure that the redistricting commission is 
politically balanced and mirrors the diversity of the state.165 Though it 
is not definite that citizen redistricting will actually happen, Levitt 
notes that perhaps open minds are the most important tools for 
 
 160. Justin Levitt, The Potential of Citizen Redistricting, Address at the Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and 
Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/ media.html [hereinafter 
Levitt, Address]; see Justin Levitt, The Potential of Citizen Redistricting, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
513 (2011) [hereinafter Levitt, Potential]. 
 161. Levitt, Potential, supra note 160, at 519–21.  
 162. Id. at 520–21. 
 163. Id. at 522–42. 
 164. Id. at 515. 
 165. Id. at 534–35. 
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individuals on the commission to have.166 The commission must 
move beyond preconceived notions of what good districts look like 
because people do not live in ―little boxes and nice little circles.‖167 
Rather, in order to draw districts that work to serve their 
communities‘ needs, the commission must be prepared and trained to 
perform technically tricky drawing. Entrusting a commission that 
embodies all these qualities with citizen redistricting could, as Levitt 
concludes, be a ―very promising experiment.‖168 
d.  Bruce McPherson—Get real, and reform169 
Bruce McPherson states that California is already being 
reformed in part. Proposition 11, passed in 2008, established a non-
partisan citizens‘ commission for drawing boundaries for state senate 
and assembly districts.170 Also, Proposition 14, passed in 2010, 
created top-two primaries for all congressional and state elections. 
These two propositions may result in more moderate legislators and 
executives being elected in California. 
In terms of future reforms, McPherson recommends relaxing 
term limits. In that regard, an initiative to that effect has already 
qualified for the 2012 ballot. That measure would allow legislators to 
serve in the state senate or assembly for up to twelve years total. He 
also recommends reforming the initiative process. These reforms 
might include banning paid signature gatherers, demanding 
coordination between initiative proponents and the legislature, and 
requiring initiatives that contain any spending mandates to identify 
funding sources. 
3.  Mechanisms for Constitutional Reform 
As we peel back the layers of causation of the state‘s problems, 
we come to the 1879 constitution, which is still in effect, albeit 
 
 166. Levitt, Address, supra note 160. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id.  
 169. Bruce McPherson, Get Real, and Reform, Address at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and Government Reform 
(Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/ media.html.  
 170. Proposition 20 in November 2010 expanded the non-partisan citizens‘ commission‘s role 
to drawing boundaries for congressional districts. See CAL. SEC‘Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA 
GENERAL ELECTION: VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 95–97 (2010). 
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absent many of the racial provisions that, at least in part, motivated 
the 1879 convention. It can be persuasively argued, and some among 
our authors have done so, as has the Times, that the constitution is 
the primary source of California‘s ills and that substantially 
amending or revising it, or even replacing it entirely, is a necessary 
predicate to real reform.171 
a.  Steven Miller—Getting to a citizens’ constitutional convention172 
Symposium contributor Steven Miller was the principal drafter 
of the Repair California initiatives.173 His article reviews the process 
that led up to Repair California‘s convention effort and the problems 
it faced had the call for a convention actually qualified for the ballot. 
For instance, the first of Repair California‘s initiatives would have 
―amended‖ article 18, section 2 of the California Constitution to 
break the monopoly the legislature currently has over calling a 
convention.174 
Legislative control over the convention process is part of the 
problem, not just in California but elsewhere.175 But fixing that 
problem runs headlong into another—actually, the same—problem, 
just stated differently. Bypassing the requirement that two-thirds of 
the legislature must call a convention might itself require a 
constitutional ―revision,‖ which can only be proposed by, you 
guessed it, two-thirds of the legislature. 
From Repair California‘s perspective, ―[i]t seemed clear that the 
legislature would never act.‖176 The group‘s stance was demonstrated 
by its end run to ―amend‖ the constitution by initiative, in the hope 
that the California Supreme Court would permit the effort. Miller 
 
 171. Editorial, supra note 85; Editorial, supra note 98. 
 172. Steven Miller, Getting to a Constitutional Convention, Address at the Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and 
Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/ media.html; see Miller, 
supra note 12. 
 173. Supra note 26. 
 174. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2. 
 175. See, e.g., The New York Convention Con, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2010, at A18 (―The 
Legislature has to start the process of calling this constitutional convention. Then, the political 
establishment—mainly the Legislature—gets to pick most of the delegates. If it sounds like an 
inside job, it is.‖). 
 176. Miller, supra note 12, at 549. 
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explores the legal implications of the convention initiatives and 
investigates whether the distinction between ―amendment‖ and 
―revision‖ is an insurmountable barrier to citizen-initiated reform. 
Miller‘s article is also designed as a practical guide for future 
reformers ―with an eye toward improving on [Repair California‘s 
initiatives] and trying in the future to chart a more successful path to 
a constitutional convention.‖177 
b.  Thad Kousser—The blessings and curses of piecemeal reform178 
Professor Kousser examines the three routes to creating 
constitutional change in California: calling a constitutional 
convention, crafting reform through the legislature, or placing 
individual amendments on the ballot.179 While Kousser evaluates 
each approach in informative detail, he focuses much of his analysis 
on the last of these three paths—California‘s piecemeal approach to 
constitutional change.180 Focusing on this third path is, of course, 
appropriate since, as Kousser notes, it has become the ―most-
trafficked avenue to constitutional change.‖181 
Here, Kousser details the blessings and the curses of the 
piecemeal approach.182 One of the most important theoretical benefits 
that the piecemeal approach provides is the opportunity for reformers 
to make incremental change, adjusting their proposals after 
observing the effects of their efforts.183 This approach, Kousser 
implies, must be addressed to efforts at reform that are both 
comprehensive and successful. Of course, as California well knows, 
the piecemeal system is also cursed with troubles. Kousser details 
these as well, and with these critiques in mind, proposes an 
alternative fourth path to California constitutional change—a series 
of bipartisan, single-subject ―logrolls‖—that Kousser contends will 
 
 177. Id. at 548. 
 178. Thad Kousser, The Blessings and Curses of Piecemeal Reform, Address at the Loyola of 
Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and 
Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/ media.html; see Kousser, 
supra note 9. 
 179. Kousser, supra note 9, at 573. 
 180. Id. at 573–74. 
 181. Id. at 583. 
 182. Id. at 573–74. 
 183. See id. at 584. 
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balance the blessings and the curses of the piecemeal approach, 
enabling effective reform.184 
c.  Ann Lousin—How to conduct a constitutional convention185 
Drawing in part on her experience with the Illinois 
Constitutional Convention in 1970,186 Professor Lousin outlines the 
steps a state—such as California—should take to hold a successful 
constitutional convention.187 Lousin guides reformers though her top 
ten list of suggested factors that should be common to all modern and 
successful constitutional conventions.188 Underpinning each factor 
are the intertwined concepts of preparation and transparency that, for 
Lousin, are the two undeniable keys to a successful convention.189 
While Lousin‘s list is drawn from her experiences in Illinois, 
and is customized for California, it is easily broadened for any sort of 
political climate in the fifty states. This wide applicability likely 
stems from the universality implicit in Lousin‘s two key concepts: 
preparation and transparency. As Lousin notes, a successful 
constitutional convention—no matter the particular political stage—
will take hard work, goodwill, and compromise, both to draft a sound 
constitution and also to persuade voters to adopt it.190 Preparation and 
transparency may sound like lofty goals, but, as Lousin concludes, 
the constitution they can help to produce is worth the effort.191 
 
 184. Id. at 574. 
 185. Ann  Lousin, How to Conduct a Constitutional Convention, Address at the Loyola of 
Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and 
Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/ media.html; see Ann M. 
Lousin, Essay: How to Hold a State Constitutional Convention in the Twenty-First Century, 44 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 603 (2011) [hereinafter Lousin, Essay]. 
 186. Lousin was a research assistant at the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, where she 
worked on the drafting of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. Lousin, Essay, supra note 185, at 603 
n.*. 
 187. Id. at 604–05. 
 188. See id. at 606. 
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 190. Id. at 621. 
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d.  Joseph Grodin—Popular sovereignty and its limits:  
Lesson for a constitutional convention in California192 
Professor Grodin examines the impediments to achieving 
structural reform in California. While there are three paths to 
changing the California Constitution, Grodin focuses on the 
particular challenges presented by what might be the most elusive 
avenue—the constitutional convention.193 Dismissing first the 
popular-initiative process as unsuitable for true structural revision 
and then the legislative initiative as unlikely to achieve the necessary 
two-thirds majority of each house of the legislature, Grodin is left 
with the third option—a constitutional convention—to achieve the 
structural reform that California needs to get back on the right track. 
However, even this remaining option presents its own challenges.194 
Focusing specifically on the procedural issues likely to arise 
from any convention proposal that departs from the format currently 
prescribed by the California Constitution—that only the legislature 
may propose a convention—Grodin models his comments after the 
now-defunct propositions that Repair California advanced in 2010. 
With an eye toward future reform, Grodin confronts two challenges: 
(1) whether the initiative process could be used to modify the 
California Constitution to allow a constitutional convention to be 
called through the initiative process without any legislative action; 
and (2) whether an initiative could also provide for the selection of 
convention delegates by a method different from that currently 
specified by the constitution.195 Exploring the relevant California 
constitutional provisions and cases, Grodin eventually answers both 
in the affirmative.196 While, as Grodin notes at the outset, the recent 
call for a constitutional convention did not qualify for the ballot, his 
insights remain highly relevant as California considers all its avenues 
to constitutional reform. 
 
 192. Joseph  Grodin, Popular Sovereignty and Its Limits, Address at the Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and 
Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/ media.html; see Joseph R. 
Grodin, Popular Sovereignty and Its Limits: Lessons for a Constitutional Convention in 
California, 44 LOY. LA. L. REV. 623 (2011) [hereinafter Grodin, Lessons]. 
 193. Grodin, Lessons, supra note 192, at 625–26. 
 194. Id. at 625. 
 195. Id. at 626, 633. 
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e.  Raphael Sonenshein—Constitutional revision commissions197 
Professor Raphael Sonenshein explores an often-forgotten 
model of governmental reform—the citizens‘ commission. While 
Sonenshein acknowledges that the alternative models, such as the 
constitutional convention, generate more excitement than the 
citizens‘ commission, inherent in this excitement is a risk of radical 
change that those currently in power find threatening.198 This risk 
provides powerful incentive for certain groups to seek control over or 
to interfere with the convention before any reform can even be 
accomplished. But while a constitutional convention has failed to 
materialize in California, reformers should not lose hope. Rather, 
they should, as Sonenshein suggests, explore alternatives.199  
 In seeking out an alternative reform model, Sonenshein directs 
reformers to look up to the federal government, across to other state 
governments, and down to local governments.200 Surveying reform 
efforts at each of these levels, Sonenshein focuses on the citizens‘ 
commission‘s rich history in American cities.201 Sonenshein contends 
that adopting a citizens‘ commission model of reform would reduce 
the initial ―cost‖ of undertaking reform, while offering voters and 
elites the possibility of well-designed reforms to gain their 
confidence.202 As evidence, Sonenshein explores the constitutional 
revision commissions in Florida and Utah as viable models for 
California to follow.203 In explaining these models‘ utility, 
Sonenshein suggests slight alterations customized for California‘s 
unique political climate.204 Of course, there are difficulties with the 
citizens‘ commission model—which are openly acknowledged—that 
 
 197. Raphael Sonenshein, Constitutional Revision Commissions, Address at the Loyola of 
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would require careful consideration to overcome. But as Sonenshein 
notes, California reform would be well worth the effort.205 
4.  The Future of Direct Democracy 
In contrast to those scholars who feel that the constitution is 
California‘s primary problem, and its amendment the essential 
solution, are those who take a more focused view. They contend that 
the institution early in the twentieth century of the initiative, the 
referendum, and the recall has been perverted by subsequent 
developments, particularly the rise to a dominant position of money‘s 
influence on the initiative process. The pieces in this part of the 
Symposium present aspects of this debate and provide important 
guidance for future actors in this field, both academic and 
governmental. 
a.  Gerald Uelmen—Enforcing the 
Single-Subject Rule for Initiatives206 
Professor Uelmen examines and laments the California Supreme 
Court‘s failure to exercise meaningful control over California‘s 
―fourth branch of government‖—the initiative process.207 For 
Uelmen, the court‘s failure comes as a great disappointment, 
especially after he hailed the court‘s removal of the Let the Voters 
Decide Act of 2000 from the ballot in Senate v. Jones208 as a sign that 
the single-subject rule had grown teeth and could be used as an 
effective means of pre-election review. Uelmen reviews California 
Supreme Court decisions since Jones that examine initiatives for 
compliance with either the single-subject rule or the prohibition of 
constitutional revision. He argues that both doctrines ―have again 
been reduced to historical artifacts‖ and that pre-election review of 
initiatives has been greatly limited.209 
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At the end of his chronology, Uelmen concludes that Jones was 
a mere ―hiccup‖ and that the court‘s subsequent decisions 
minimizing the ability of the single-subject rule and the prohibition 
against constitutional revision to work as effective tools of pre-
election review of initiatives have strangled California‘s ability to 
reconsider and improve its political ideas.210 Instead, the state is left 
without any ―ability to regulate and fine-tune the application of any 
changes.‖211 Where the court has failed to enforce constitutional 
limits on the currently ―unbridled power of the initiative in twenty-
first century California,‖212 the state is left to amend its amendments, 
as that is the only effective means of evolving its political ideas. 
b.  Robert M. Stern—Improving the initiative process213 
Robert Stern suggests that rather than continue down the path of 
direct democracy, California should return to voluntary indirect 
democracy.214 Under that system, the legislature reviews an initiative 
before it appears on the ballot; if the legislature votes to pass the 
proposal, then the initiative is adopted without appearing before the 
voters.215 Stern examines the history of voluntary indirect democracy 
in California, arguing that its infrequent use reflects not that it failed 
as a process but that it was the result of a now-defunct constitutional 
provision.216 Although California repealed indirect democracy in 
1966, Stern shows that indirect democracy is viable by examining its 




Stern issues a rallying cry, designating 2012 as the election year 
to propose an initiative amending the initiative process itself. 
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Suggesting a mandatory version of indirect democracy different from 
its predecessor, Stern argues that indirect democracy will lessen two 
problems produced by direct democracy—that voters are 
overwhelmed by both too many ballot measures and poorly drafted 
measures.218 Citing his forty years of experience as a faithful observer 
of the legislature, Stern estimates that indirect democracy would 
reduce the number of ballot measures in each election by one or two 
initiatives.219 While Stern acknowledges that some Californians may 
be reluctant to return additional responsibility to the legislature, 
indirect democracy will produce better-drafted initiatives since 
circulation to the legislature will increase the likelihood that errors 
will be caught and remedied so that the text better reflects the 
proponents‘ intent.220 
c.  Bruce Cain—Fixing ballot box budgeting221 
Bruce Cain says that it would be important to change the 
initiative process, but adds that nothing will be changed. He also 
explains that courts are no longer a substantial check on the process. 
Specific California Supreme Court decisions demonstrate the court‘s 
reluctance to enforce strictly the single-subject requirement and its 
reluctance to strike down constitutional initiatives as being revisions 
instead of amendments. Cain also explains that not all of California‘s 
current problems may be blamed on initiatives. For example, the 
budget problems—including the pension underfunding—are not 
unique to California. state budgeting is always difficult, he says, 
because most states do not permit deficit budgeting. There are, 
however, problems specific to California that come as a result of the 
initiative process, which he calls ―ballot box budgeting.‖222 Cain 
noted that these are not necessarily partisan, or liberal versus 
conservative, features of the process.223 For example, budgeting 
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mistakes are usually made during good economic times, but the 
consequences do not appear until economic downturns. Part of the 
reason that voters do not trust legislatures, and thus turn to 
initiatives, is that legislatures are often placed in the untenable 
position of having to fix problems created by prior initiatives. 
The most important problem in this area is what Cain labels 
―fiscal federalism,‖ meaning that the state government, for the most 
part, collects the taxes, while local entities make the spending 
decisions.224 This creates incentives that are ―out of line.‖225 As with 
other aspects of the initiative process, Cain remains pessimistic as to 
the likelihood of reform, primarily because powerful special interests 
are well served by keeping the system as it is. 
In the question period, Cain pointed out another anomaly in 
California‘s budgetary system: ordinary policy changes often require 
a supermajority, while basic structural changes—such as those often 
carried out through initiative constitutional amendments—pass with 
a simple majority.226 This is a complete reversal of the standard 
theory of democratic government. 
d.  Christopher Elmendorf—Why sensible judicial enforcement of the 
amendment/revision distinction requires a constitutional revision227 
Professor Christopher Elmendorf discussed the California 
Supreme Court‘s jurisprudence regarding challenges to initiative 
changes to the constitution based on the distinction between 
―amendments‖ and ―revisions.‖ to the constitution. The basic tenet is 
that a ―revision‖ is a change that works a ―revisional effect‖ on our 
―basic plan of government.‖228 According to Elmendorf, the court has 
stated that this distinction is fundamental to the very idea of the 
constitution as an ―instrument of a permanent and abiding nature,‖229 
 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Christopher Elmendorf, Why Sensible Judicial Enforcement of the Amendment/Revision 
Distinction Requires a Constitutional Revision, Address at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and Government Reform 
(Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/ media.html.  
 228. Id.  
 229. Id.  
    
432 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:393 
 
This is why the revision procedure is ―high-cost, difficult, and time-
consuming.‖230 
However, the court‘s actual doctrinal test for a ―revision‖ does 
not track this idea. The court‘s test asks whether, as to the challenged 
change in the constitution, its ―revisionary purpose‖ is revealed on its 
face at the time of the challenge, or whether it has been demonstrated 
that the change will ―necessarily or inevitably produce a revisionary 
effect.‖231 This test has led the court to reject challenges to many 
nominal-appearing changes that have had a substantial revisionary 
effect on the plan of government. 
Elmendorf suggested three principal reasons for the court‘s 
reluctance to invalidate initiative-based changes to the constitution: 
the court‘s reluctance to decide so-called political questions; its 
disinclination to overturn the will of the people; and its concern that 
rejection of the change will simply send the issue back into a 
―legislative stranglehold.‖232 
Finally, Elmendorf proposed a solution to the problem of the 
court‘s reluctance: a legislative constitutional amendment (to be 
ratified by the voters) that would (1) declare the ―basic principles of 
the Constitution‖ as a guide to the court in ruling on initiative 
challenges; (2) instruct the court to resolve such challenges on the 
basis of empirical evidence as to how the change would work; 
(3) create periodic constitutional-review commissions to propose 
changes to the constitution; and (4) provide for the automatic 
placement of a constitutional-convention initiative on the ballot 
every twenty years.233 In the question period, Elmendorf explained 
why he thought that the legislature might act to put such an 
amendment on the ballot: because of its strong interest in getting the 
court to overturn term limits.234 
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e.  John S. Caragozian—From crisis to solution— 
California’s problems in two  books: A review of                 
Remaking California and California Crackup235 
A Symposium organizer, and a co-author of this Introduction, 
John Caragozian reviews two timely books that deal with this 
Symposium‘s theme—California‘s problems and solutions.236 The 
first, Remaking California, edited by R. Jeffrey Lustig, categorizes 
events such as Proposition 13, the three-strikes law, and Proposition 
140 into three structural problems: (1) the governance crisis, (2) the 
representation crisis, and (3) the social order crisis.237 Several 
experts, including Symposium moderator Dan Walters of the 
Sacramento Bee, explore these crises.238 The second book, California 
Crackup, by Joe Mathews and Mark Paul, also lists California 
problems, noting that the worst problem of all is that under 
California‘s current governmental system, none of the other 
problems can be fixed.239 
Both books t to place California on the road to reform by 
suggesting a variety of solutions that parallel the Symposium‘s 
themes. For example, Mathews and Paul propose mandating that 
initiatives be drafted by professional governmental staff so as to 
avoid incomprehensible, self-contradictory, or otherwise improper 
language.240 This concern with poorly drafted initiatives reminds us 
of Stern‘s hope that the legislative review of initiatives implicit in a 
switch back to indirect democracy would increase the likelihood that 
errors in initiative drafts would be remedied in order to better reflect 
the proponents‘ intent. While Mathews and Paul propose a different 
means, they share an end similar to that of Stern‘s. This is just one of 
the commonalities the Symposium shares with both California 
Crackup and Remaking California, and as California considers all of 
its routes to reform, the combination serves as an important and 
informative review of today‘s proposals. 
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B.  Keynote Addresses 
1.  Governor Gray Davis241 
Former Governor Gray Davis provided the Symposium‘s 
keynote address at the event‘s luncheon. 
The theme of the governor‘s remarks was his prescription for 
what is needed to repair California‘s problems to ―get Sacramento 
back on track.‖242 The problem, he said, is that legislators‘ interests 
are not aligned with the public interest. Both political parties have 
conflicting but legitimate points of view, to which their legislators 
strictly adhere. Nothing positive will happen, however, until 
legislators in both parties are willing to challenge their respective 
party‘s orthodoxy. 
Two recently passed laws provide some hope that this will 
happen in the future. One of these is an initiative that removes 
control of redistricting from the legislature and turns it over to a 
citizen panel. The other is the open-primary reform, which passed in 
June 2010. This reform should provide more centrist legislators by 
giving the general voter ―two cracks‖ at voting for legislators in each 
election cycle. A previous similar reform was struck down by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, but that decision was, in the governor‘s 
opinion, based on a misunderstanding of California politics. 
Because of these two reforms, at least 20 percent of the 
legislators should be willing to tackle the big problems that the 
current legislature will not deal with. If those 20 percent do not, they 
will lose their seats in the 2012 election. 
To these two reforms, the governor would add two others: a 
―rainy day fund‖ included in each budget and a mandatory spending 
cap. The rainy-day fund would smooth out the effect of the business 
cycle on the state‘s revenues. The state will be forced to show the 
same restraint in its spending that citizens do in their family budgets. 
The governor then listed four additional reforms that he feels 
would help to alleviate the problems caused by chronically late state 
budgets. The first two would permanently dock the pay of legislators 
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and the governor for every day after July 1 of each year that the 
budget is late and would forbid political fundraising as long as the 
budget is late. The third would limit legislative sessions to four 
months out of each year, providing less time in Sacramento for 
legislators to pass unnecessary laws and more time out of 
Sacramento for constituent service. Finally, the governor advocated a 
basic reform of the initiative process that would deny a place on the 
ballot to any initiative that did not specify a funding source for its 
proposal. 
Expanding on the initiative issue, the governor cautioned that 
Proposition 27, a provision on the November 2010 ballot, would be a 
―poison pill‖ that could repeal the redistricting initiative that he had 
lauded at the beginning of his remarks.243 
Governor Davis completed his remarks by reminding the group 
that California still has a positive influence because it ―provides 
innovation to the world.‖244 
2.  Dan Schnur245 
Dan Schnur, the Symposium‘s tribute-dinner keynote speaker, 
opened with an optimistic message to participants and sponsors: ―As 
dire a picture as today‘s panelists have painted, there is hope for the 
state of California and its processes of government and politics 
simply because there are at least small groups of people who care 
enough to think about it, to talk about, and to worry about‖ fixing 
California.246 
Schnur‘s second and related point was that ―politics is way too 
important to leave to the politicians.‖247 A politician‘s goal, ―first, 
foremost, and always, is to get re-elected,‖ not to bring necessary 
reforms.248 That job is for the people of California. While all the 
proposed or recently enacted structural reforms are important, they 
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are not ends unto themselves but means to allow substantive change. 
That requires not merely the reform movement, of which Schnur is a 
proud member, but the active involvement of people who do not 
otherwise live, eat, and breathe politics. ―California will overcome its 
sea of intractable public policy challenges, but not because of a 
constitutional convention or even initiative reform, but because we 
convince ordinary people there is a place for them in the political 
process.‖249 
How does this come about? How can regular citizens be 
motivated to take up Steve Jobs‘s challenge to ―make a dent in the 
universe‖?250 One way ―is to make it as easy as possible for average 
citizens to participate in the process, rather than make it harder.‖251 
Schnur asserts that that is his principal goal as Chair of the California 
Fair Political Practices Commission. ―The political process belongs 
to the people, not to the politicians.‖252 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
We offer this Symposium issue of the Law Review to its readers, 
as was the live Symposium to its attendees, in the spirit of open 
inquiry, open expression, and open debate that the organizers feel 
must precede any meaningful reform that can provide relief for 
California‘s manifold problems. 
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